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Environmental	destruction	as	(objectively)	uneventful	and	(subjectively)	
irrelevant	
O.	I.	Ollinaho		This	text	is	Author’s	Accepted	Manuscript	that	was	published	in	2016	in	
Environmental	Sociology,	Vol.	2,	No.	1,	53–63,	http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23251042.2015.1114207		This	essay	contributes	to	the	recent	criticism	against	individualism	and	cognitivism	in	environmental	social	scientific	theorizing	by	conceptualizing	two	undertheorized	phenomena	related	to	environmental	changes:	uneventfulness	and	irrelevance.	Under	much	of	environmental	predicament	lies	a	process	characterized	by	recurrent	acts	through	which	pieces	of	sociomateriality	are	taken	from	or	added	to	a	particular	sociomaterial	system.	Such	process	not	only	produces	cumulative	sociomaterial	changes,	but	also	the	corresponding	withdrawals	and	additions	lose	their	eventfulness	over	time.	Elaborating	on	Theodore	Schatzki’s	work,	complexity	is	built	into	the	concept	of	practice	rather	than	accounting	for	complexity	with	the	interrelatedness	of	practices.	Another	part	of	the	essay	analyzes	the	subjectivity	of	the	actor,	focusing	on	the	relevance	structures	of	the	ordinary	citizens	in	the	Global	North.	Environmental	changes	are	imposed	to	the	consciousness	as	intellectual	problems,	which	tend	to	be	incommensurate	with	the	pragmatic	necessities	of	everyday	life.	Applying	Alfred	Schütz’s	phenomenological	sociology	to	environmental	phenomena	opens	up	new	avenues	for	empirical	environmental	sociology.	Understanding	the	objective	uneventfulness	and	subjective	irrelevance	associated	with	much	of	environmental	changes	helps	explain	the	inactivity	of	the	masses	amid	widespread	attention	on	the	environmental	predicament.		  
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1. Introduction This	paper	scrutinizes	at	the	level	of	social	practice	how	"we	cause	environmental	problems	collectively	as	participants	to	global	industrial	market	society	…	as	a	globally	dispersed	and	often	socially	unequal	mass	of	actors"	(Arponen	2013,	47–48),	that	is,	how	environmental	changes	are	being	produced	through	the	“normal	workings”	of	industrial	societies	(Rudel,	Roberts,	and	Carmin	2011,	221).	Building	on	Alfred	Schütz’s	(e.g.	Schutz	1962,	1964)	and	Theodore	Schatzki's	(e.g.	Schatzki	1996,	2010)	work,	the	points	of	departure	for	this	essay	are	the	direct	experience	of	the	differentiated	individuals	in	the	global	system	and	the	ways	their	actions	hang	together.	The	corpus	of	environmental	changes	is	in	nature	cumulative;	it	is	made	of	recurrent	additions	to	or	
withdrawals	from,	to	use	Allan	Schnaiberg’s	(1980)	terms,	natural	or	built	environments	through	the	reproduction	of	more	or	less	established	practices.	Such	a	cumulative	change	underlies	much	of	the	environmental	social	theorizing,	but	has	remained	unarticulated	at	the	level	of	social	practices.	Another	phenomenon	closely	looked	at	in	this	essay	is	the	often	implied	issue	that	most	environmental	changes	are	intrinsically	irrelevant	for	the	lay	people	in	their	paramount	reality;	“the	subuniverse	of	the	sensorily	perceivable,	physical	world”	(Schutz	and	Luckmann	1973,	5).	If	environmental	sociology	aspires	to	answer	the	late	Ulrich	Beck’s	question,	“Why	is	there	no	storming	of	the	Bastille	because	of	the	environmental	destruction	threatening	mankind”	(2010,	254),	we	have	to	understand	the	objective	uneventfulness	of	environmental	changes	and	relevance	structures	of	the	differentiated	masses.		Neither	uneventfulness	nor	irrelevance	has	been	placed	under	a	systematic	analytical	scrutiny	to	date	even	though	such	phenomena	underlie	an	increasing	part	of	the	environmental	literature.	Frederick	Buttel	distinguished	between	two	general	categories	of	environmentally	related	phenomena:	“intentionally-environmental”	and	“unintentionally-environmental”	(1996).	The	former	“consists	of	behaviors	or	institutional	patterns	that	are	self-consciously	environmental	or	environmentally	relevant”	and	the	latter	“consists	of	‘ordinary’	social	practices	and	phenomena	that	have	environmental	dimensions	or	implications,	although	they	remain	invisible	or	unrecognized”	(Buttel	1996,	66–67).	Nearly	two	decades	ago	Buttel	(1996)	observed	that	scholars	had	tended	to	privilege	one	or	the	other	of	these	categories,	which	may	have	resulted	in	some	pertinent	gaps	in	the	literature.	Environmental	social	scientific	literature	–	itself	intentionally	environmental	–	has	most	prominently	analyzed	the	intentionally	environmental,	that	is,	social	movements,	local	struggles,	conflicts,	politics,	values,	justice,	consciousness,	modernization,	management,	and	ethics	related	to	the	natural	environment.	In	this	paper,	I	focus	on	the	unintentionally	environmental,	that	is,	the	“normal	workings”	of	our	global	industrial	market	society.	While	such	normal	workings	have	been	addressed	at	the	societal	and	global	level	in	elaborate	accounts	(e.g.	Foster	2000;	Hornborg	2009;	Moore	2014),	these	accounts	have	been	interested	in	“the	
organization	of	labour	to	the	exclusion	of	the	practice	of	labour”	(Schneider	and	McMichael	2010,	461	emphases	in	original).	The	unintentionally	environmental	at	the	practice	level	and	at	the	level	of	subjectivity	have	not	received	sufficient	attention,	or	so	this	essay	argues	and	provides	some	ideas	how	to	address	them.		It	is	obvious	for	many	that	much	of	environmental	change	is	produced	by	the	habitual	(see	Kurz	et	al.	2015	for	review),	that	"environmental	concerns	remain	on	the	periphery	of	social	life"	(Macnaghten	2003,	63)	and	that	for	most	of	the	people	the	human-to-nature	relationship	is	a	highly	mediated	one	(Dickson	2000;	Stoner	2014;	Weis	2013).	Nonetheless,	it	seems	that	under	a	better	part	of	the	environmental	social	scientific	–	and	all	of	natural	scientific	–	literature	there	lie	individualist	(Shove	2010),	value-based	(Stoner	2014),	and	cognitivist	assumptions,	albeit	often	latently	(Arponen	2013,	2015).	This	is	to	see	that	more	information,	increased	environmental	consciousness,	and	
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“greener”	values	of	individuals	–	as	well	as	groups	and	masses	–	will	do	the	job	of	saving	the	planet	(Dickson	2000;	Shove	2010).	Another	approach	has	been	to	shift	the	attention	from	the	global	environmental	problems	(which	do	not	ring	the	bell)	to	the	local	environments	that	are	already	relevant	for	the	people,	like	Macnaghten	(2003)	maneuvered.	This,	however,	is	to	shy	away	from	the	global	level	destructive	patterns	–	the	problem	at	hand.	Focusing	on	environmental	changes	that	are	relevant	for	ordinary	people	would	miss	the	majority	of	the	global	changes,	most	of	which	“are	plainly	remote	from	everyday	life	experience	so	that	their	reality	is	not	apparent	to	ordinary	citizens”	(Yearley	2005,	315).	Focusing	on	the	subjectivity	of	the	actor	is	not	to	embrace	an	individualist	or	a	cognitivist	stance,	as	will	be	clear.	The	practice	turn	is	argued	to	resolve	the	problems	of	individualism	and	exaggerated	epistemic	powers	of	actors	(Arponen	2013)	that	Elizabeth	Shove	(2010)	claimed	to	waste	social	scientific	effort	in	helping	to	resolve	environmental	problems,	a	view	agreed	with	here.	While	the	practice	stance	takes	practices	as	“the	‘smallest	unit’	of	social	analysis”	(Reckwitz	2002,	249)	and	hence	effectively	breaks	away	from	the	individualist	undercurrent,	this	literature	seems	to	be	chiefly	studying	"a	small-world	of	human	action"	(Arponen	2015,	6)	and	flat	social	practices	such	as	showering,	eating,	cycling,	driving,	and	consuming.	Such	dispersed	practices,	as	Schatzki	calls	practices	that	"center	around	a	single	type	of	action"	(2002,	88),	cannot	accommodate	the	highly	differentiated	masses	carrying	the	(also)	vertically	organized	complex	practices.	Moreover,	they	cannot	easily	reach	far	enough	in	spatial	terms	against	the	backdrop	of	the	global	market	society	(Arponen	2015).	While	Schatzkian	practice	theory	underlies	much	of	the	consumption	literature	(Warde	2005;	Shove	2010),	some	of	Schatzki's	central	ideas	of	practices	remain,	at	best,	implicit	in	the	literature.	In	particular,	integrative	practices	–	that	is,	"the	more	complex	practices	found	in	and	constitutive	of	particular	domains	of	social	life"	(Schatzki	1996,	98)	–	have	not	been	adequately	applied	in	the	literature,	even	though	this	dichotomy	has	not	remained	unacknowledged	(Warde	2005).		This	paper	belongs	to	phenomenological	social	scientific	theorizing,	which	has	been	limitedly	applied	to	environmental	social	sciences	(Brown	and	Toadvine	2003;	Williams	and	Parkman	2003).	I	lean	heavily	on	Alfred	Schütz’s	work	(e.g.	Schutz	1962,	1964)	and	build	on	Theodore	Schatzki's	practice	theory	(e.g.	Schatzki	1996,	2010).	It	is	noted	that	both	Schutz's	and	Schatzki's	work	is	complex	and	profound	and	cannot	be	addressed	with	much	depth	in	a	single	essay.	The	style	of	the	essay	is	therefore	is	to	point	to	particular	blind	spots	in	the	current	literature	and	cast	light	upon	avenues	for	future	research.	Below,	I	first	address	the	“objective	uneventfulness”	of	environmental	changes.	This	is	to	explain	how	uneventful	sociomaterial	changes	–	an	important	part	of	all	environmental	changes	–	are	produced	by	the	very	texture	of	social	reality,	that	is,	by	social	practices.	Then,	I	scrutinize	the	“subjective	irrelevance”	of	environmental	changes	by	addressing	the	relevance	structures	and	discuss	the	relation	between	the	environmental	layperson	and	environmental	expert.	I	conclude	by	discussing	implications.	
2. Objective uneventfulness Cumulative	sociomaterial	change	is	ubiquitous	in	the	contemporary	world	that	has	crossed	the	planetary	limits.	Cumulative	changes	are	products	of	the	state	of	affairs,	the	established	social	world	comprised	of	a	mesh	of	orders	and	practices	under	a	persistent	process	of	naturalization	(Bourdieu	1990),	most	aspects	of	which	we	tend	to	take	for	granted	(Schutz	1962).	While	the	Anthropocene	pictures	an	essentially	undifferentiated	humanity	producing	the	predicament	of	the	planet,	the	concept	of	Capitalocene	shifts	
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the	blame	from	individuals	to	the	capitalist	system,	arguing	that	the	planetary	predicament	is	a	structural	problem	(Moore	2014).	Indeed,	the	late	modernity	entails	an	"unequal	mass	of	actors"	that,	as	Arponen	explains,	does	"not	share	a	sphere	of	life	and	thereby	knowledge,	beliefs,	and	the	like	about	the	broader	system"	(2013,	48).	Such	a	view	poses	a	conceptual	dilemma	for	the	practice	literature	that	sees	carriers	of	practices	as	dependent	on	shared	assumptions.	If	the	practice	literature	is	to	contribute	to	our	understanding	of	the	pertinently	structural	problem,	it	has	to	be	able	at	least	to	conceptualize	1)	practices	that	can	accommodate	highly	differentiated	carriers	and	2)	complex	material	arrangements.	While	one	avenue	for	solving	these	problems	could	be	to	dig	into	the	interrelatedness	of	practices,	another	path,	chosen	here,	could	be	to	see	how	activities	of	differentiated	carriers	of	integrative	practices	"hang	together"	(Schatzki	1996,	14).	This	is	to	build	complexity	into	the	concept	of	practice	rather	explain	complexity	with	the	interrelatedness	of	practices.	
2.1	Integrative	and	dispersed	practices		Adopting	a	practice	view	is	to	see	practices	as	the	texture	of	social	reality:	“the	social	world	is	first	and	foremost	populated	by	diverse	social	practices”	(Reckwitz	2002,	256).	At	its	most	basic	level,	a	practice	is	“a	temporally	unfolding	and	spatially	dispersed	nexus	of	doings	and	sayings”	(Schatzki	1996,	89).	Yet,	Schatzki	(2002)	argues	that	such	concept	of	social	practice	is	not	enough	to	conceptualize	social	worlds,	but	we	have	to	understand	as	well	orders	–	arrangements	of	people,	artifacts,	and	things.	"Human	coexistence,"	Schatzki	writes,	"transpires	as	and	amid	an	elaborate,	constantly	evolving	nexus	of	arranged	things	and	organized	activities"	(2002,	p.	xi).	Here,	the	concept	of	practice	also	involves	Schatzki's	orders	and	hence	practices	can	even	entail	a	highly	complex	arrangement	of	material	artifacts,	such	as	factories	or	infrastructures,	that	help	to	hang	human	activity	together.	Albeit	acknowledged	(Warde	2005),	Schatzki's	distinction	between	two	ideal	types	of	practices:	dispersed	and	integrative	(Schatzki	1996),	has	remained	inadequately	applied	in	literatures	of	consumption	and	sustainability.	While	Shove	(2010)	differentiates	practices-as-entities	and	practices-as-performance	based	on	Schatzki's	writings,	this	is	not	the	same	distinction	as	that	between	simple	and	complex	practices,	which	latter	allow	for	conceptualizing	large	and	hierarchically	linked	doings	and	sayings.	I	envision	social	practices	in	a	continuum,	one	end	of	which	accommodates	integrative	practices	and	the	other	end	dispersed	practices	that	course	through	integrative	practices	(Schatzki	2002).		Distinguishing	between	simple	practices	such	as	"describing,	ordering,	questioning,	reporting,	and	examining"	(Schatzki	2002,	88)	and	complex	ones	such	as	functionally,	cognitively,	and	materially	binding	arrangements	and	activities	of,	say,	an	organization,	is	important	in	order	to	understand	both	the	mundane	and	the	–	even	globally	–	orchestrated	nature	of	human	activity.	Arrangements	of	things	are	especially	important	in	integrative	practices	in	which	doings	and	sayings	hang	together	prominently	not	only	through	understandings	(as	in	dispersed	practices),	but	also	through	explicit	rules	and	teleoaffective	structures	that	to	Schatzki	are	"a	range	of	normativized	and	hierarchically	ordered	ends,	projects,	and	tasks,	to	varying	degrees	allied	with	normativized	emotions	and	even	moods"	(2002,	80).	Note,	as	Schatzki	insists,	that	integrative	practices	should	
not	be	thought	as	"assemblages	of	dispersed	practices,	which	are	added	together	to	form	integrative	ones"	(1996,	99).	The	integrative	end	of	the	continuum	should	be	seen	to	accommodate	practices	that	entail	even	a	highly	complex	arrangement	of	material	artifacts.	In	addition	to	understandings,	rules,	and	other	cognitive	structures,	such	material	arrangements	should	be	seen	as	a	prominent	source	that	makes	the	doings	and	sayings	hang	together.	They	are	"mediatory	objects"	(Ginev	2014,	81)	or	"mediating	
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artefacts"	(Miettinen,	Paavola,	and	Pohjola	2012,	9)	that	link	subjective	and	objective	spheres.	Thus	instead	of	bracketing	such	arrangements	as	the	context,	these	arrangements	could	be	seen	as	constitutive	of	practices.	These	sociomaterial	arrangements	of	course	also	entail	the	natural	environment	constituting,	together	with	the	built	environment,	“the	ontological	structure	of	the	pre-given	world”	(Schutz	1966,	125),	"which	we	have	to	interpret	in	order	to	find	our	bearings	within	it	and	come	to	terms	with	it”	(Schutz	1962,	10).	
2.2	Differentiated	carriers	of	practices	The	vast	and	harmful	material	impacts	produced	by	humanity	are	unevenly	distributed	between	the	center	and	periphery	of	the	capitalist	system;	the	corresponding	modes	of	production	involve	highly	unequal	positions	of	individuals,	groups,	and	societies	alike	(e.g.	Hornborg	2009;	Moore	2014).	Therefore	the	pragmatic	necessities	(Schutz	1964)	as	well	as	cognitive	issues	such	as	knowledge,	beliefs,	values,	and	the	like	about	this	broader	system	sharply	differ	between	people	(Arponen	2013)	even	though	they	may	be	carriers	within	the	same	integrative	practice.	Understanding	environmental	predicament	necessitates	paying	"attention	to	the	role	that	power	and	social	inequality	play	in	shaping	human/nonhuman	interactions"	(Pellow	and	Nyseth	Brehm	2013,	229).	Indeed,	as	Davide	Nicolini	put	it,	"practices	and	their	association	perform	different	and	unequal	social	and	material	positions,	so	that	to	study	practice	is	also	the	study	of	power	in	the	making"	(2009,	1394).	If	remaining	close	to	the	dispersed	end	of	the	practice	continuum,	it	is	difficult	to	see	inequalities	produced	and	maintained	within	and	through	practices.	Seeing	organizations	within	particular	industries	–	or	even	supply	chains	as	a	whole	–	as	integrative	practices,	we	can	fathom	different	carriers	of	such	practices	as	located	in	particular	points	in	hierarchical	and	geographical	terms	and	with	differentiated	perspectives	and	knowledge	of	the	activities	that	hang	together	not	only	through	cognitive	structures,	but	also	through	materiality	(technology,	other	material	artifacts,	energy,	and	so	on)	and	monetary	relations	and	transactions	(Hornborg	2009).	Debt,	in	particular,	has	been	a	prominent	binder	of	social	actors	that	entails	as	well	as	produces	inequalities	(Gerber	2014).		The	critique	against	individualist	and	small	world	approaches	(Arponen	2015;	Dickson	2000;	Stoner	2014)	urges	us	to	understand	the	complex	mediation	of	the	sociomaterial	structures	through	which	our	activities	impact	the	natural	and	built	environments.	As	Barnabas	Dickson	(2000)	explained,	most	of	us	rarely	act	directly	with	the	natural	environment,	but	indirectly	through	others	–	most	often	through	a	chain	of	buyer-seller	relations	–	who,	most	typically,	are	spatially	distant	from	us.	The	concept	of	structural	
environmental	burden	underscores	that	"every	good	and	service	available	to	us	presuppose	the	production	processes	behind	their	existence"	(Arponen	2013,	50),	which	have	already	consumed	matter-energy.	Whereas	it	is	certainly	possible	to	impact	the	production	of	goods	and	services	through	consumer	choices	–	particularly	with	regard	to	alimentation	(Weis	2013)	–	due	to	the	highly	mediated	nature	of	the	market	relations,	such	impacts	should	be	seen	as	a	very	ineffective	form	of	impacting	the	entire	systems	of	production	(Dickson	2000)	and	policies	attempting	to	steer	such	choices	even	more	so	(Shove	2010).	Furthermore,	the	mere	existence	of	material	infrastructure	in	and	around,	say,	energy,	transport,	or	hospitals	inherently	involves	matter-energy,	and	individuals	are	most	often	not	able	to	choose	such	infrastructures	and	can	affect	the	existence	of	such	infrastructures	to	a	very	small	extent.	
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2.3	Practices	and	stuck	and	loose	matter	In	order	to	explicate	one	very	general	level	characteristic	of	some	environmental	changes	–	their	cumulative	nature	–	materiality	involved	in	all	practices	is	compressed	to	two	ideal	types,	stuck	and	loose	matter.	Stuck	matter	refers	to	material	artifacts	–	tools	or	equipment	(Miettinen	et	al.	2012)	–	involved	in	practices,	as	well	as	to	highly	complex	material	arrangements	such	as	those	involved	in	(the	frames	of)	different	infrastructures,	that	is,	buildings,	roads,	hospitals,	cables,	and	so	on.	Such	materiality	remains	essentially	unchanged	through	the	particular	moments	of	reproduction	of	practices	that	make	use	of	it.	While	roads	and	other	infrastructure	wear	out	gradually,	one	car	driving	a	road	leaves	it	fundamentally	intact,	in	the	same	way	as	one	document	leaves	the	cable	through	which	it	was	downloaded	essentially	unchanged.	Whereas	the	gradual	decay	of	roads	impacted	by	masses	of	cars	through	many	years	is	an	important	phenomenon	and	can	be	seen	as	one	type	of	cumulative	change,	the	cumulative	change	focused	on	in	this	paper	is	such	that	requires	an	analysis	of	another	category	of	materiality	involved	in	practices:	loose	matter.	Loose	matter	comes	close	to	one	of	Schatzki's	categories	of	materiality,	that	of	“biological	and	physical	flows	that	pass	through	practice-arrangement	nexuses”	(Schatzki	2010,	137).	This	refers	to	matter-energy,	such	as	foods	and	fuels,	but	also	the	materiality	worked	on	that	might	be	“spontaneously	provided	by	nature”	or	more	commonly	materiality	“filtered	through	past	labour”	(Benton	1989,	65).	Loose	matter	also	has	structural	environmental	burden,	which	in	the	case	of	oil	products	depends	at	least	on	the	source,	mode	of	production,	and	transport	of	oil.	Loose	matter	is	that	materiality	circulating	in	the	metabolic	accounts	as	material	flows	(Foster	2000).	Note	that	while	stuck	matter	is	functionally	–	instead	of	absolutely	–	stuck	in	the	practice,	thereby	forging	the	characteristics	of	the	practice,	loose	matter	is	indispensable	for	the	running	of	the	practice	altogether.	Farming	practices,	for	instance,	can	make	use	of	harvesters	and	other	machines	(stuck	matter),	but	without	the	food,	air,	and	water	consumed	by	the	farmer	herself	and	energy	from	the	sun,	water,	and	nutrients	(loose	matter)	that	form	the	principal	substance	of	the	crops,	farming	practices	cannot	run	at	all.	And	if	a	harvester	were	employed,	it	would	not	run	at	all	without	fuel.	Some	stuck	matter	permits	some	types	of	activities	that	could	not	be	done	without	them.	Think	of	flying.	Note	that	stuck	and	loose	matter	are	defined	only	through	their	relation	with	practices	and	for	this,	the	car	is	stuck	matter	within	the	practice	of	car	commuting	regardless	of	its	loose	nature	in	absolute	terms	when	in	motion.	Also,	some	stuck	matter	is	very	briefly	used	within	practices;	think	of	disposable	items.	The	boundaries	between	these	relational	categories	are	porous	in	the	empirical	reality	and	the	flows	involved	depend	to	a	large	extent	on	the	timescale	we	choose	to	study.	It	is	intelligible	to	speak	of	stuck	matter	only	with	relation	to	particular	moments	of	reproduction	because	over	longer	time	periods,	stuck	matter	flows	in	and	out	of	practices	creating,	for	instance,	diverse	flows	of	e-waste	when	new	electronic	devices	replace	the	old.	The	categories	of	stuck	and	loose	matter	are	very	general;	they	are	needed	to	conceptually	clarify	a	cumulative	type	of	sociomaterial	change,	which	is	a	very	general	level	process.	
2.4	Cumulative	sociomaterial	change	Each	and	every	practice	requires	inputs	(or	withdrawals)	and	produces	outputs	(or	additions),	therefore	forming	material	flows	of	loose	matter	in	between.1	Change																																																									1	Additions	can	cumulate	as	more	or	less	enduring	stocks	of	loose	matter,	such	as	buildings,	roads,	and	other	infrastructures	that	function	as	stuck	matter	for	a	diverse	set	of	practices.	
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produced	through	reproduction	of	practices	is	cumulative	in	the	sense	that	some	loose	sociomateriality	is	repeatedly	added	to	or	withdrawn	from	a	system	(Schnaiberg	1980),	thus	producing	a	buildup	or	drain	–	when	it	is	not	reused	by	another	social	practice	or	when	natural	processes	do	not	absorb	or	renew	such	matter	completely.	Cumulative	change	is	an	aggregate	phenomenon	–	it	is	born	macro.	Sociomaterial	accumulation	rarely	makes	sense	at	the	unitary	level	(at	the	level	of	particular	act	of	withdrawal	or	addition),	but	typically	only	when	many	unitary	level	recurrent	acts	are	aggregated	over	time	at	some	level.	What	is	more,	a	discrete	event	at	one	level	of	observation	–	or	in	one	lifeworld	(Schutz	1964)	–	might	be	a	continuation	at	more	aggregate	levels	and	objectively	an	uneventful	occurrence.	For	instance,	purchasing	a	car	–	or	a	bicycle	–	is	a	unitary	level	act	that	constitutes,	together	with	many	similar	actions,	practices	around	car	(or	bicycle)	production	and	consumption.	Such	an	act	is	often	a	major	event	for	the	purchaser.	For	the	seller	such	an	event	is	much	less	eventful	–	it	is	a	mundane	daily	recursive	activity.	Furthermore,	mere	numbers	mark	it	for	the	manufacturer,	for	a	city	planner,	or	for	an	economist.	Zooming	in	and	out	of	practices	by	foregrounding	certain	aspects	and	lifeworlds	and	bracketing	others	(Nicolini	2009)	in	synchronic	or	diachronic	dimensions	helps	to	understand	how	cumulative	changes	are	produced	and	perceived.		Let	us	look	another	example.	Building	a	mine	or	a	factory	is	not	a	continuation	or	uneventful	in	any	meaningful	aspect	at	the	local	level,	but	instead	often	acutely	contested	and	debated,	especially	when	material	grievances	are	present	(Kröger	2014).	There	is,	however,	a	sense	in	which	such	an	event	is	a	continuation	of	something.	Such	an	investment	can	be	seen	as	an	embodiment	of	recipe	knowledge	of	solving	definite	problems	stating	that	the	large-scale,	centralized,	and	modernist	units	solve	the	problem	of	economic	growth	–	and	that	of	development	–	best	(and	exclusively).	Applying	such	higher	forms	of	knowledge	(Schutz	and	Luckmann	1973)	of	an	economist	can	be	seen	as	making	even	global	level	activities	hang	together.	Nevertheless,	the	most	obvious	objective	uneventfulness	of	environmental	change	refers	to	that	taking	place	after	the	construction	of	an	industrial	unit.	When	production	begins	it	tends	to	be	gradually	institutionalized	as	a	natural	part	of	the	sociohistorical	constellation	(Bourdieu	1990),	particularly	if	there	are	no	movements	organized	to	contest	it	(Kröger	2014).	Yet,	such	routinized	production	–	even	if	it	remains	utterly	unchanged	–	gradually	alters	its	surrounding	sociomateriality	through	recurrent	withdrawals	and	additions.	While	in	analytic	terms	we	can	analyze	single	practices,	we	have	to	understand	that	they	"overlap,	interweave,	and	also	conflict"	(Schatzki	2002,	88)	with	other	integrative	practices	and	hence	cumulation	is	typically	an	aggregate	cumulation	of	a	set	of	different	practices	and	hence	seldom	a	linear	pattern.	Accumulation	inherently	linked	with	loose	matter	differs	from	the	typical	referent	of	the	term:	capital	accumulation.	Cumulative	change	also	does	not	refer	to	gradual	change	in	the	content	of	social	practices	and	relations	through	“the	processes	of	drift,	layering,	and	conversion”	(Moore	2011,	303),	or	to	a	continual	evolution	due	to	"changing	circumstances,	accumulating	experience,	bodily	peculiarities,	and	shifts	in	the	orders	and	practices	that	the	actions	engage	or	are	part	of"	(Schatzki	2002,	242).	It	also	does	not	refer	to	Hawley’s	cumulative	change,	which	“constitutes	growth	of	the	system,	a	movement	from	small	and	simple	to	large	and	complex”	(1978,	787).	Needless	to	say	that	such	non-cumulative	(as	understood	here)	changes	in	the	contents	and	reproduction	of	practices	are	fundamentally	important	in	the	age	of	innovation.	To	recapitulate,	accumulation	here	refers	to	a	process	characterized	by	recurrent	acts	–	"repetition	of	the	same"	(Schatzki	2002,	9)	–	through	which	pieces	of	sociomateriality	are	taken	from	or	added	to	a	particular	sociomaterial	system.	It	should	be	clear	that	such	a	change	represents	an	ideal	type	(Schutz	1964),	which	is	seldom	found	in	its	pure	
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form	in	the	empirical	reality.	Nonetheless,	along	with	the	increasing	scale	and	scope	of	human	material	production,	the	normal	workings	of	industrial	societies	require	and	consume	enough	loose	matter	to	systematically	create	“rifts”	disrupting	the	natural	cycle	of	nutrients	and	materials	at	the	planetary	level	(Foster	2000;	Moore	2014).	Accumulation	–	both	drain	and	buildup	–	of	sociomateriality	takes	place	rather	ubiquitously.		
2.5	Cognition,	attention,	and	cumulative	change	How	such	accumulation	and	involved	flows	are	structured	has	been	given	much	attention	in	macro-sociological	accounts.	Much	less	effort	has	been	allocated	to	understand	the	cognitions	related	with	such	change.	Many	scholars	acknowledge	the	habitual	nature	of	much	of	“environmentally	consequential	behavior”	(Kurz	et	al.	2015).	To	be	sure,	all	behavior	is	environmentally	consequential;	only	some	of	it	is	intentionally	so	(Buttel	1996).	Even	though	notions	of	ordinariness	and	mundane	character	of	human	behavior	are	not	infrequently	referred	to	(Arponen	2013;	Kurz	et	al.	2015),	a	closer	look	at	the	cumulative	sociomaterial	change	may	reveal	something	new.	All	repeated	activity	tends	to	be	habitualized	and	is	in	a	process	of	becoming	taken	for	granted	(Berger	and	Luckmann	1966),	resulting,	as	Bourdieu	wrote,	that	“regularities	inherent	in	an	arbitrary	condition	…	tend	to	appear	as	necessary,	even	natural”	(1990,	53–54).	The	ordinary	(including	the	material	arrangement)	in	a	particular	social	situation	is	a	result	of	past	recurrent	activity	and	tends	to	be	taken	for	granted	by	the	members	of	the	corresponding	social	world.	Instead	of	an	event,	the	"repetition	of	the	same"	(Schatzki	2002,	9)	is	an	ordinary	occurrence;	it	is	the	very	source	of	the	ordinary.	Hence,	not	only	environmental	changes	produced	by	the	reproduction	of	social	practices	are	cumulative,	but	also	the	recurrent	additions	and	withdrawals	gradually	lose	their	objective	eventfulness	over	time.	Referring	to	uneventfulness	is	not	to	refer	to	something	not	taking	place,	but	something	taking	place	in	a	manner	that	not	distinguished	from	what	is	apperceived	as	normal	and	to	which	we	do	not	pay	much	attention.	Even	though	no	act	can	be	repeated	exactly	in	the	same	manner,	we	tend	to	typify	experiences	–	there	we	go	
again	(Berger	and	Luckmann	1966)	–	even	if	they	are	not	exactly	the	same	as	previous	ones.	In	the	same	way	that	practices	“always	need	to	be	drawn	to	the	fore,	made	visible	and	turned	into	an	epistemic	object	in	order	to	enter	discourse”	(Nicolini	2009,	1392),	cumulative	changes	also	have	to	be	drawn	to	the	fore	from	their	taken-for-grantedness	in	order	to	make	them	objects	of	attention	–	a	work	of	environmental	scientists,	activists,	journalists,	and	others.	As	we	can	observe	only	a	fraction	of	environmental	changes	through	our	own	sensory	equipment,	nearly	all	what	we	know	of	environmental	changes	is	experts'	observations	made	with	the	use	of	sensory	equipment	(Yearley	2005)	and	supplied	to	us	through	various	types	of	media	(Macnaghten	2003).	Yet,	“in	an	age	that	venerates	instant	spectacle,”	as	Rob	Nixon	(2011,	6)	characterizes	the	present	time,	media	and	scholars	alike	tend	to	pay	attention	to	surprises	rather	than	to	what	is	uneventful.	Cumulative	changes	then	tend	to	be	left	“largely	unobserved,	undiagnosed	and	untreated”	(Nixon	2011,	6).	No	doubt	the	paramount	cumulative	change	of	our	times,	that	of	greenhouse	gases	in	the	atmosphere,	is,	regardless	of	all	the	bias	(Boykoff	2011),	massively	discussed	and	debated	in	all	media,	but	it	should	be	understood,	at	most,	as	a	tip	of	the	iceberg	in	terms	of	the	cumulative	sociomaterial	changes	in	the	late	modernity.	In	fact,	the	accumulation	of	greenhouse	gases	is	an	emergent	aggregate	of	a	diverse	set	of	smaller	cumulative	changes	that	can	be	studied	through	particular	integrative	practices	–	those	around	industrial	agriculture	(Weis	2013)	and	fossil	fuels	in	particular	–	that	produce	them.	
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Land	degradation,	desertification,	groundwater	depletion,	rural	exodus,	population	growth,	deforestation,	urbanization,	eutrophication,	extinction	of	species,	ecosystem	destruction,	and	various	other	cumulative	sociomaterial	changes	produced	by	the	normal	workings	of	the	industrial-meat-eating-consumer	civilization	appear	much	less	routinely	in	contemporary	media	(Almiron	and	Zoppeddu	2015;	Boykoff	2011),	partly	because	the	paramount	phenomenon	–	climate	change	–	detracts	attention	from	other	phenomena	(Crist	2007).	How	are	such	and	other	environmental	changes	experienced	by	different	types	of	people?	
3. Subjective irrelevance The	macro-sociological	as	well	as	practice	level	approaches	have	aimed	to	heave	the	political	discussion	around	environmental	predicament	from	individual	(consumption)	to	more	structural	issues	(Shove	2010)	and	attempted	to	collapse	the	agency-structure	dualism.	This	essay	is	no	different.	Yet,	whereas	"social	practice	theory	de-centres	individuals	from	analyses"	(Hargreaves	2011,	79)	and	practices	are	“the	‘smallest	unit’	of	social	analysis”	(Reckwitz	2002,	249),	analyzing	social	practices	should	not	inhibit	looking	as	well	at	the	subjectivity	of	those	differentiated	actors	located	in	different	positions	in	supply	chains,	geographical	positions,	different	experiences,	beliefs,	and	whatnot.	Schatzki	argues	that	"fuller	understanding	of	the	social	nature	of	mind/action	will	yield	deeper	insight	into	the	social	character	of	the	individual	subject,	the	phenomenon	from	which	all	individualisms	set	out	and	to	which	all	wholisms	must	at	some	point	descend"	(Schatzki	1996,	20).	Schutz	and	Schatzki	agree	upon	the	importance	of	understanding	how	subjectivities	are	constituted	within	the	life-world;	that	is,	as	a	part	of	the	mesh	of	orders	and	practices.	Yet,	taking	seriously	the	critique	against	cognitivism	(Arponen	2013,	2015),	leaning	on	shared	mentalities	is	problematic	in	the	global	market	economy	even	if	the	institution	of	money	–	buyer-seller	relations,	debt	relations,	and	so	on	–	is	imposing	similar	necessities	on	people	through	the	very	same	relations	that	mediate	our	relationship	to	the	natural	environment	(Dickson	2000;	Gerber	2014;	Hornborg	2009).	Obviously,	monetary	relations	impose	distinct	relevances	on	lenders	and	borrowers.	
3.1	Relevances	and	practical	intelligibility	What	Schatzki	calls	practical	intelligibility	that	"governs	action	by	specifying	what	an	actor	does	next	in	the	continuous	flow	of	activity"	(2002,	75)	comes	close	to	Schutz's	concept	of	relevance:	“it	is	relevance	to	an	individual	which	shapes	the	selectivity	of	his	experience,	that	is,	which	determines	what	arouses	his	attention,	where	his	attention	leads	him	and	how	far	it	leads	him”	(Straßheim	2010,	1418).	What	is	relevant	is	not	the	same	as	what	is	said	to	be	important.	What	is	relevant	or	practically	intelligible	makes	sense	to	do	and	"also	causes	activity	in	the	senses	of	formal	and	final–but	not	efficient–causality"	(Schatzki	2002,	75	emphasis	in	original).	Of	pivotal	importance	is	that	relevances	–	or	practical	intelligibility	–	are	constituted	within	the	social	and	physical	worlds	as	part	of	the	mesh	of	orders	and	practices	"where	the	realms	of	sociality	and	individual	mentality/activity	are	at	once	organized	and	linked"	(Schatzki	1996,	13).	We	cannot	(rationally	or	with	mere	will	of	mind)	choose	our	relevances	because	they	are	the	result	of	our	past	experiences,	which	are	always	also,	if	not	predominantly,	pragmatically	motivated	and	tied	to	our	social	and	physical	surroundings,	which	we	can	only	limitedly	modify.	We	can	certainly	try	to	and	trying	–	itself	an	experience	–	certainly	changes	something.	Needless	to	say	that	the	extent	to	which	our	activities	are	guided	on	issues	beyond	the	pragmatic,	that	is,	on	epistemic	or	normativist	determinations	(Arponen	2015;	Dickson	2000),	greatly	varies	between	different	
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individuals,	groups,	and	societies	due	to	the	very	different	sets	of	experiences	people	within	have	been	exposed	to.		
3.2	Structures	of	relevance		Schutz	distinguished	structures	of	relevance	through	zones	of	reach,	origination,	and	person	types	(Schutz	1964).	First,	Schutz	identifies	four	zones	of	relevance	that	differ	with	regard	to	how	we	experience	and	are	able	to	dominate	these	parts	of	reality.	While	the	zone	of	primary	relevance	is	"that	part	of	the	world	within	our	reach	which	can	be	immediately	observed	by	us	and	also	at	least	partially	dominated	by	us"	(Schutz	1964,	124),	in	the	other	extreme	there	are	zones	of	absolute	irrelevance	in	which	"no	possible	change	occurring	within	them	would	-	or	so	we	believe	-	influence	our	objective	at	hand"	(Schutz	1964,	125).	Second,	Schutz	distinguishes	between	intrinsic	and	imposed	relevances.	In	essence,	the	former	type	of	relevance	originates	from	our	own	activities	and	the	latter	is	imposed	by	others'	activities	(Schutz	1964).	Last,	there	are	the	ideal	types	of	persons:	the	expert,	the	man	on	the	street,	and	the	well-informed.	"The	expert	starts,"	Schutz	writes,	"from	the	assumption	not	only	that	the	system	of	problems	established	within	his	field	is	relevant	but	that	it	is	the	only	relevant	system"	(1964,	130).	The	world	to	the	man	on	the	street	is	“in	first	place	not	an	object	of	our	thought	but	a	field	of	domination”	(Schutz	1962,	227).	The	third	type,	the	well-informed,	gathers	"as	much	as	knowledge	as	possible	of	the	origins	and	sources	of	the	relevances	actually	or	potentially	imposed	upon	him"	(Schutz	1964,	130–131).	These	categories	are	ideal	types	and,	as	Schutz	wrote	"each	of	us	in	daily	life	is	at	any	moment	simultaneously	expert,	well-informed	citizen,	and	man	on	the	street,	but	in	each	case	with	respect	to	different	provinces	of	knowledge"	(1964,	123).	Ideal	types	also	provoke	debate.	
3.3	Zones	and	environmental	changes	Even	if	real,	most	environmental	changes	“are	plainly	remote	from	everyday	life	experience”	(Yearley	2005,	315)	as	the	paramount	reality	of	everyday	life	is	the	urban	reality	for	the	increasing	part	of	the	lay	people	and	experts	alike	and	accumulation	typically	(but	not	always)	takes	place	in	the	edges	of	societies.	Cumulative	changes	can	certainly	reach	the	pragmatic	life	of	the	urban	lay	people	the	epitome	of	which	are	the	current	water	shortages	in	California	and	São	Paulo.	Typically,	however,	cumulative	changes	tend	to	“remain	imperceptible	to	the	senses,	either	because	they	are	geographically	remote,	too	vast	or	too	minute	in	scale,	or	are	played	out	across	a	time	span	that	exceeds	the	instance	of	observation	or	even	the	physiological	life	of	the	human	observer”	(Nixon	2011,	15).	Modern	technology	makes	cumulative	changes	less	visible	even	for	the	blue-collar	specialists	(Schnaiberg	1980);	humans	work	with	machines	and	machines	work	with	loose	matter,	creating	epistemic	barriers	between	humans	and	loose	matter	and	its	accumulation.	There	is	a	non-identity	between	the	objective	and	subjective	dimensions	of	the	environmental	predicament	(Stoner	2014).	Not	only	do	we	not	see	the	water	needed	to	produce	our	beef	and	car	–	or	our	salad	and	bicycle	for	that	matter	–	but	we	see	even	less	the	withdrawals	and	additions	of	such	loose	matter.	In	sum,	most	environmental	changes	take	place	outside	the	zone	of	primary	relevance	of	the	majority	–	of	at	least	the	urban	populations	–	and	hence,	the	environment	is	an	
intellectual	problem	(Foster	and	Holleman	2012)	for	most	of	us	regardless	of	which	type	–	lay	people,	well-informed,	or	expert	–	we	belong	to.	This	is	to	talk	of	the	majority	in	the	Global	North;	obviously	there	are	populations	whose	livelihoods	are	directly	and	drastically	transformed	by	environmental	changes,	which	belongs	to	the	intentionally	
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environmental	phenomena	that	has	been	and	should	continue	to	be	a	prominent	focus	of	environmental	sociology.		
3.4	Origination	and	environmental	changes	The	labor	process	has	been	alienated	from	the	natural	environment	due	to	the	concentration	of	the	means	of	production	on	fewer	and	fewer	hands	and	to	the	elaboration	of	increasingly	sophisticated	tools	(Benton	1989;	Foster	2000).	Today	the	separation	is	close	to	complete	in	a	substantial	part	of	the	populations.	Hence	the	livelihood	of	a	typical	citizen	–	particularly	in	the	Global	North	–	is	rarely	directly	dependent	on	the	surrounding	natural	environment,	so	environmental	changes	have	no	or	very	little	pragmatically	bound	–	intrinsic	–	relevance	for	them.	The	functioning	of	the	global	industrial	market	economy	conceals	the	impacts	that	changes	in	natural	environments	have	on	our	livelihoods	(Dickson	2000).	The	chains	of	buyer-seller	relations	are	so	long	and	complex	that	it	is	very	difficult	to	fathom	how	changes	impact	our	zone	of	primary	relevance	in	any	realistic	terms,	which	does	not	inhibit	making	interpretations	of	such	impacts.	Others'	observations	and	explications	impose	relevances	of	environmental	changes	on	our	subjective	consciousness	(Schutz	1964);	"the	global	media	are	of	major	importance	to	how	people	understand	and	make	sense	of	environmental	issues"	(Macnaghten	2003,	67).	It	is	worthwhile	to	repeat	that	meanings	so	imposed	to	us	are	an	intellectual	issue	(Foster	and	Holleman	2012)	and	whereas	epistemic	considerations	(Arponen	2015)	surely	weigh	in	our	behavior,	they	are	often	belittled	by	“the	pragmatic	necessities	of	the	everyday	life”	(Berger	and	Luckmann	1966,	135).	The	issue	of	awareness	of	environmental	predicament	has	been	a	salient	topic	since	the	early	environmental	sociology	(Buttel	1996;	Rudel	et	al.	2011),	yet	analyzing	the	mere	awareness	is	clearly	not	enough,	as	the	value-action	gap	(Arponen	2015)	implies.	Much	of	human	conduct	is	of	everyday	quality	and	even	"our	occupational	activities,"	as	Arponen	writes,	"are	often	daily	recursive,	very	mundane	and	everyday	activities,	even	when	they	require	considerable	concentration	or	other	mental	efforts"	(2013,	50).	Yet,	it	is	so	easy	to	embrace	the	assumption	according	to	which	"humans	are	rational,	that	humans	make	real	choices,	and	that	given	enough	time	and	education	we	will	solve	environmental	problems,"	as	Williams	and	Parkman	note	and	continue	that	to	"consider	the	reverse,	that	our	consciousness	is	conditioned	by	taken-for-grantedness	is	a	bitter	pill	for	sure."	(2003,	455)	Continuing	to	assume	rationally	behaving	individuals	may	be	explainable	by	the	fact	that	the	environmental	social	scientific	literature	yet	builds	rather	directly	on	natural	scientific	findings	and	takes	the	attached	package	of	assumptions	along.		
3.5	Environmental	layperson	and	well-informed	Typical	persons	tend	to	be	assumed	as	in	a	deficit	model,	that	is,	as	ignorant,	but	eager	to	acquire	and	accept	(scientific)	knowledge	and	“adapt	to	the	changed	epistemic	circumstances”	(Maranta	et	al.	2003,	162).	Such	a	view	comes	close	to	Schutz's	ideal	type	of	well-informed	citizen	and	assumes	a	subordination	of	human	conduct	to	scientific	mind,	or	at	least	to	human	rationality.	Yet,	there	is	a	"need	to	think	non-epistemically,"	as	Arponen	put	it,	"not	in	terms	of	what	norms,	values,	beliefs	and	the	like	govern	and	drive	human	action,	but	how	do	human	relate	to	each	other	in	terms	of	their	diverse	activities"	(2015,	13).	Williams	and	Parkman	expressed	the	problem	bluntly:	“Unless	we	better	understand	the	pretheoretical	and	pragmatic	nature	of	human	consciousness,	rational/scientific	attempts	to	deal	with	large-scale	
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environmental	problems	will	fail”	(2003,	449).	Schutz	argued	that	people	tend	to	have	a	natural	attitude	in	living	their	lives.	The	natural	attitude	towards	life	–	which	does	not	refer	to	epistemic	attitudes	toward	particular	issues	in	Shove's	ABC	model	(2010)	–	is	characterized	as	"a	direct	orientation	towards	things	and	not	at	all	occupied	with	the	critique	of	knowledge”	(Moran	2013,	111),	or	as	a	typical	attitude	of	everyday	life	“in	which	we	have	not	theoretical	but	eminently	practical	interest”	(Schutz	1962,	208).			While	certainly	people	do	transcend	such	attitude	of	the	man	on	the	street	and	confront	the	reified	appearances,	pertinent	phenomenological	argument	is	that	many	of	us	do	not	do	that	most	of	the	time.	Furthermore,	Schutz	writes:	"In	all	matters	not	connected	with	such	practical	purposes	of	immediate	concern	the	man	on	the	street	accepts	his	sentiments	and	passions	as	guides"	(1964,	122).	The	debate	upon	the	existence	of	climate	change	seems	to	demonstrate	that	there	are	indeed	plenty	of	men	and	women	on	the	street.	Whereas	we	may	aim	to	be	well-informed	in	some	spheres	of	life,	for	instance,	in	terms	of	the	food	we	eat,	it	is	quite	another	issue	how	well	we	succeed	to	actually	know	the	origins,	impacts,	and	contents	of	our	food	in	our	particular	material	arrangement	or	even	less	to	acquire	and	consume	such	food	we	deem	healthy	and	ecological	–	insofar	as	we	are	determined	to	do	so.	It	should	be	clear	that	such	success	is	to	a	large	extent	not	a	question	of	individual	treat,	but	a	practice	level	issue	both	in	epistemic	dimension	of	inducing	the	determinations	and	in	material	dimension	affording	to	do	so.	To	what	extent	do	the	social	realities	and	material	arrangements	structure	our	activities	and	how	much	can	we	deviate	from	them	consciously?	Another	question	to	be	studied	empirically	is	whether,	to	what	extent,	and	for	how	much	of	their	time	people	in	different	parts	of	the	world	fit	as	referents	to	the	above	described	ideal	types.		
3.6	The	environmental	expert	Much	of	environmental	literature	seems	to	assume	environmental	despoliation	as	a	relevant	issue	for	everyone	insofar	as	they	are	aware	of	such	issues	(Stoner	2014).	There	is	absolutely	nothing	wrong	with	being	aware,	conscious,	and	critical	about	environmental	destruction.	However,	when	it	comes	to	analytically	imposing	such	a	stance	on	other	people,	things	become	more	complicated.	For	Alfred	Schütz,	social	scientific	scholars	have	a	theoretical	attitude	toward	the	social	world;	they	interpret	what	is	already	pre-interpreted	by	the	people	in	the	social	world.	Such	theoretical	attitude	is	“that	of	a	mere	disinterested	observer	of	the	social	world”	(Schutz	1962,	36).	Rather	ironically,	environmental	social	scientific	scholars	seem	not	to	be	disinterested	observers	with	regard	to	the	exacerbating	impact	humans	have	on	their	natural	environment.	Such	concern	is	often	the	very	reason	for	experts'	research	–	they	are	highly	interested	observers.	The	disinterestedness	refers	to	the	fact	that	the	scientist	“is	not	involved	in	the	actor’s	hopes	and	fears”	and	to	the	fact	that	scientists’	“system	of	relevances	differs	from	that	of	the	interested	parties”	(Schutz	1962,	26).	Indeed,	“what	is	taken	for	granted	in	the	biographical	situation	within	the	social	world	of	the	daily	life	may	become	questionable	for	the	scientist,	and	vice	versa;	what	seems	to	be	of	highest	relevance	on	one	level	may	become	entirely	irrelevant	on	the	other”	(Schutz	1962,	37).	In	an	ideal	case,	expert's	relevance	system	comprising	of	imposed	relevances	–	that	of	environmental	destruction	–	overrules	all	the	other	relevances,	also	the	pragmatic	relevances	that	the	people	in	the	social	situation	always	have.	Certainly	this	provocative	account	simplifies	things.	The	most	prominent	exception	for	the	above	account	is	of	course	that	group	of	environmental	experts	who	study	particular	cases	of	intentionally	environmental	phenomena	through	ethnomethodology	or	similar	methods	in	which	some	–	or	even	most	–	of	the	intrinsic	relevances	of	the	observer	and	the	observed	are	shared.	However,	for	the	scholars	studying	the	unintentionally	
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environmental,	the	incommensurability	between	experts'	imposed	relevances	and	the	layperson's	intrinsic	relevances	may	be	an	important	lesson.	If	the	claim	that	relevances	are	distinct	is	accepted,	the	subsequent	question	is	how	relevances	can	be	imposed	on	others;	that	is,	how	to	transform	imposed	relevances	into	intrinsic	relevances.	One	lead	could	be	to	empirically	analyze	how	perception	of	different	types	of	messengers	impacts	our	reception	of	relevances	(e.g.	Schutz	1964,	131–134).	Such	an	analysis,	however,	remains	in	the	epistemic	sphere	and	we	should,	in	tandem,	study	"how	diverse	activities	and	actors	relate	to	each	other"	(Arponen	2015,	13)	and	the	pragmatic	necessities	of	differentiated	people	as	a	part	and	in	the	midst	of	the	mesh	of	orders	and	practices.	How	should	we	structure,	in	cognitive	and	material	terms,	the	very	experiences	of	the	people	so	that	their	intrinsic	relevances	would	be	outright	sustainable	from	the	outset?	
4. Discussion and implications Criticism	against	both	individualism	and	cognitivism	in	environmental	social	scientific	literature	is	gaining	momentum	(e.g.	Kurz	et	al.	2015;	Shove	2010),	possibly	because	social	theory	does	not	explain	human	activity	correctly;	the	inactivity	of	the	masses	remains	an	anomaly	(Arponen	2015;	Beck	2010).	This	essay	is	part	of	such	criticism.	Alfred	Schütz's	work,	as	the	foundation	for	social	constructionism	(Berger	and	Luckmann	1966),	is	easily	seen	as	cognitivist	and	the	focus	on	subjectivities	as	individualist	stance.	Yet,	Schutz's	work	is	both	not	individualist	and	not	cognitivist	since,	as	it	should	have	become	evident,	the	social	and	the	physical	world	is	fundamental	in	it	in	terms	of	the	constitution	of	subjective	relevances.	Setting	“the	structure	of	the	
Lebenswelt	as	experienced	by	men	in	their	natural	attitude”	(Schutz	1962,	145)	as	one	point	of	departure	of	environmental	social	scientific	analysis	and	conducting	sociological	analyses	of	the	reality	of	everyday	life	in	which	scholars	would	be	“only	tangentially	interested	in	how	this	reality	may	appear	in	various	theoretical	perspectives	to	intellectuals”	(Berger	and	Luckmann	1966,	33)	ought	to	be	an	important	step	toward	an	environmental	sociology	that	aims	to	take	seriously	the	pragmatic	and	non-epistemic	dimension	of	human	consciousness	(Arponen	2015;	Williams	and	Parkman	2003).	In	such	an	approach,	individuals	should	be	seen	foremost	as	carriers	of	diverse	social	practices	and	their	relevances	formed	through	performing	such	practices	(Bourdieu	1990;	Shove	2010).	It	is	a	question	of	analyzing	how	the	mesh	of	orders	and	practices	induces	relevances	through	structuring	the	experiences	of	the	unequal	mass	of	people	hanging	together	(Schatzki	1996)	as	a	part	of	the	global	system	(Arponen	2013).	The	normal	workings	of	industrialized	market	societies	have	been	theorized	most	prominently	through	macro-sociological	approaches	asking,	“what	does	all	this	mean	for	us,	the	scientific	observer?”	(Schutz	1964,	6).	Such	accounts	are	needed;	they	provide	crucial	insights	at	the	systemic	level	and	are	indispensable	in	the	political	debates	in	which	aggregate	level	issues	are	on	the	table.	Yet	they	alone	are	not	sufficient	for	the	challenges	of	environmental	sociology:	“Like	any	complex	problem,	understanding	the	multiple	dimensions	of	environmental	change	requires	close	and	obsessive	attention	to	detail	from	multiple	perspectives”	(Lockie	2015,	1).	Studying	practices	is	not	straightforward	because	they	constitute	“the	scarcely	notable	background	of	everyday	life”	(Nicolini	2009,	1392)	and	our	epistemic	culture	makes	it	cumbersome	to	analyze	the	pragmatic	dimension	of	reality,	which	can	be	only	limitedly	accessed	through	what	people	say.	While	overt	meanings	acquired	through	surveys	and	other	means	might	tell	of	awareness	and	consciousness,	they	hardly	tell	of	relevances,	which	can	only	be	accessed,	as	Bourdieu	insisted,	situating	"oneself	within	'real	activity	as	such',	that	is,	in	the	practical	relation	to	the	world"	with	its	presences,	urgencies,	and	preoccupations	(1990,	52	emphasis	in	original).	
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The	natural	environment	is	predominantly	an	issue	at	the	intellectual	level	for	the	most	of	the	people,	particularly	in	the	Global	North	–	and	hence	a	question	of	ethics,	morality,	and	justice.	Thus,	the	omission	in	this	paper	of	the	blossoming	literatures	of	environmental	justice	and	ethics	should	not	be	seen	as	a	refutation	to	those	fields.	Quite	the	contrary,	we	should	attempt	to	understand	and	change	the	epistemic	sphere	of	humans	(also)	in	terms	of	nature,	and	environmental	rights	and	justice,	for	instance,	are	crucial	in	political	struggles.	But	we	should	understand	that	knowledge	about	environmental	destruction	is	an	intellectual	issue	and	that	the	intellectual	sphere	is	frequently	incommensurate	with	the	pragmatic	sphere;	the	pragmatic	necessities,	urgencies,	preoccupations,	and	such	(Bourdieu	1990;	Schutz	1964)	time	and	again	overrun	whatever	moral,	ethical,	or	other	mental	determinations	we	embrace.	We	might	do	differently	than	we	have	sworn	to	do	simply	because	the	latter	might	be	exceedingly	difficult	to	do	or	because	the	situation	induced	us	to	do	something	else.	However,	the	main	question	not	is	whether	one	person	decides	to	act	in	a	particular	manner,	but	how	the	relevances	or	practical	intelligibilities	of	many	people	are	structured	through	differential	positions	within	practices,	carriers	of	which	can	be	changed	if	they	are	deemed	not	to	fulfill	their	roles	(Dickson	2000).	The	mere	awareness	or	consciousness	of	environmental	problems	is	not	enough;	practices	hardly	change	through	increased	intellectual	awareness	because	they	are	foremost	motivated	by	pragmatic	concerns.	Or	are	they?	Has	the	scientific	conception	of	the	world	replaced	“the	naïve,	natural,	pre-scientific	approach	to	the	world”	(Moran	2013,	106)?	How	much	has	the	natural	attitude	been	replaced	if	at	all	and	how	much	we	are	yet	enslaved	to	our	pragmatic	needs?	What	really	is	relevant	–	genuinely	important	–	for	people	in	their	lifeworlds?	How	far	can	knowledge,	ethics,	and	morality	take	us	in	the	social	reality	in	which	virtually	everything	can	be	bought	with	money?	How	difficult	in	pragmatic	terms	should	car	commuting	become	so	that	people	would	not	only	start	to	think	of	changing,	but	also	actually	change	their	commuting	habits?	How	to	disrupt	meat-eating	habits	that	have	massive	environmental	impacts?	How	well	and	to	what	extent	can	relevances	be	imposed	through	the	symbolic	and	material	spheres?	How	are	the	Internet,	different	media,	and	globalization	impacting	these	spheres	–	and	the	paramount	reality,	our	zone	of	primary	relevance,	itself?	What	are	the	major	building	blocks	–	and	processes	–	creating	the	systems	of	relevance?	These	and	other	questions	should	be	answered	if	we	want	to	take	up	the	challenge	to	understand	what	makes	sense	for	people	–	as	differentiated	carriers	of	global	integrative	practices	–	to	do	(Schatzki	2002)	and	sufficient	reasons	to	change	what	makes	sense	to	do.	How	to	make	such	challenges	relevant	for	the	environmental	sociologists?				 	
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